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Abstract—Collaborative learning allows multiple clients to train a joint model without sharing their data with each other. Each client
performs training locally and then submits the model updates to a central server for aggregation. Since the server has no visibility into
the process of generating the updates, collaborative learning is vulnerable to poisoning attacks where a malicious client can generate a
poisoned update to introduce backdoor functionality to the joint model. The existing solutions for detecting poisoned updates, however,
fail to defend against the recently proposed attacks, especially in the non-IID setting. In this paper, we present a novel defense scheme
to detect anomalous updates in both IID and non-IID settings. Our key idea is to realize client-side cross-validation, where each update
is evaluated over other clients’ local data. The server will adjust the weights of the updates based on the evaluation results when
performing aggregation. To adapt to the unbalanced distribution of data in the non-IID setting, a dynamic client allocation mechanism is
designed to assign detection tasks to the most suitable clients. During the detection process, we also protect the client-level privacy to
prevent malicious clients from stealing the training data of other clients, by integrating differential privacy with our design without
degrading the detection performance. Our experimental evaluations on two real-world datasets show that our scheme is significantly
robust to two representative poisoning attacks.
Index Terms—Poisoning attack, collaborative learning, deep learning, privacy.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
C OLLABORATIVE learning is an attractive framework forimplementing distributed learning with massive clients. In
contrast to conventional machine learning approaches which re-
quire a central data center, collaborative learning allows clients
to perform training locally, and only share the local model rather
than the training data. In each training round, a subset of clients are
selected, each of which downloads the current global model and
computes an updated model based on their local data. The model
updates are sent to the server, who is responsible for aggregation,
to construct an improved global model. Motivating examples
include training next-word predictors or speech classifiers on
large-scale users’ smartphones.
To make full use of clients’ data without revealing their pri-
vacy, the server by design has no visibility into the local data and
training process in collaborative learning. This also opens the door
to poisoning attacks where malicious clients can create poisoned
updates to introduce backdoor functionality to the global model
[1], [2]. In particular, recent works show that a poisoned update
can control the behavior of the global model on an attacker-chosen
backdoor subtask while maintaining a good performance on the
collaborated learning task [3]. Figure 1 presents an overview of
the poisoning attack.
In centralized learning where the server has access to the
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training data, detecting poisoned models can be realized by
directly evaluating the trained model on data samples [4], or
utilizing another trusted dataset to retrain a detector [5], [6]. In
collaborative learning, however, these methods are not applicable
since the server can no longer access the training data. More
importantly, the poisoned model can still maintain a high accuracy
on the main task, making it more difficult to detect anomalies. To
solve this problem, solutions based on statistical analysis [7], [8]
may be the potential countermeasure. Auror [1] showed that if
the malicious client continually submits poisoned models in every
round, misbehaviors can be found by measuring the difference
of distributions between benign and malicious updates through
clustering. Krum [9] and its variants [7], [8] tried to improve
the robustness of the model by removing updates that are far
from the average. Nevertheless, both of these two methods are
not suitable for non-IID (independent and identically distributed)
training data [3]. Recently FoolsGold [2] is designed to detect
the sybil attack, which identifies malicious clients by calculating
the similarities between different updates. Yet, it can be evaded
by performing a single-client attack or decomposing the poisoned
model into several orthogonal vectors.
In this paper, we design a new method to effectively detect
anomalous updates in collaborative learning. Instead of focusing
on equipping the server, we propose delegating the detection tasks
to the clients whose private data can be used to evaluate the
performance of the updates. Based on the evaluation results, the
server can then adjust the weights when aggregating the updates.
Our method remains effective not only for the IID setting, but also
for the non-IID setting. During the detection process, we also aim
to prevent malicious clients from stealing the training data of other
clients. We integrate differential privacy to the delegated detection
tasks to protect the client-level privacy without degrading the de-
tection performance. Our experimental evaluations on the MNIST
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Fig. 1: Overview of the poisoning attack
and CIFAR-10 datasets show that our client-side cross-validation
is significantly robust to two representative poisoning attacks: the
label-flipping attack and the backdoor attack. In summary, we offer
the following contributions.
• We present a novel scheme to defend against poisoning
attacks in collaborative learning by delegating detection
tasks to clients for cross-validation, such that anomalous
updates can be easily detected in the IID setting.
• We extend our cross-validation architecture to the non-IID
setting. A dynamic client allocation method is designed
to assign the detection task to the most suitable clients.
Besides, we protect the client-level privacy to prevent the
potential leakage on the clients’ sensitive data.
• We evaluate our scheme experimentally on two real-world
datasets against two representative poisoning attacks. The
results demonstrate that our scheme can detect poisoned
updates with high probability, and cause a negligible
impact on the accuracy of the global model.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide necessary background knowledge about
machine learning, collaborative learning and poisoning attacks.
2.1 Machine Learning
In this paper, we focus on the generic setting of supervised
learning for classification tasks. Let D be a dataset that contains
n samples x1,x2, . . . ,xn, each of which sample has d features
and corresponds to a label yi. The goal of a machine learning
algorithm is to obtain a modelM that takes a sample x as input
and outputs a predicted value y′ which should be as close as
possible to its ground truth y. In general, x can be parameterized
with a vector or a matrix which consists of real numbers. In order
to find the optimal set of parameters forM, the training algorithm
tries to minimize a loss functionQ(w) = 1n
∑n
i=1Qi(w), where
w is the vector/matrix of the model parameters, and Qi is the loss
value for the i-th sample in D.
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD). SGD is the most
common method to minimize the loss function, which itera-
tively seeks for the minimum value in each dimension, i.e.,
w = w − αn
∑n
i=1∇Qi(w), where α is the learning rate used
to control the step size of gradient descending. Since the loss
function is used to estimate the difference between the predicted
value and the ground truth, this equation can be divided into two
phases: forward propagation that aims to calculate the predicted
value of sample xi, and backward propagation that calculates the
update of w. Calculating gradient over the whole dataset can
achieve fast convergence with a small number of iterations, but
results in a high computation cost in each iteration. In contrast,
selecting a single sample in each iteration is fast for the gradient
computation but leads to a slow convergence rate. To address this
issue, a small subset of samples (called a batch) are randomly
chosen in each iteration, and we can tune the batch size to balance
the convergence speed against the overhead.
Neural Networks. Neural networks, or say deep learning,
have been widely used in many fields such as computer vision,
natural language processing and bioinformatics, thanks to its capa-
bility of modeling complex relationships among high-dimensional
data. A neural network consists of multiple layers of neurons. Each
neuron receives inputs from the previous layer, conducts linear
transformation and/or nonlinear mapping, and feeds outputs to the
next layer. Neural networks can fulfill multi-class classification
tasks with multiple output neurons which constitute the output
layer zi, where softmax function f(zi) = e
zi∑l
i=1 e
zi
is leveraged
to transform the inputs to a probability distribution among all
output categories (l is the total number of categories). The forward
propagation of neural networks is similar to that of regression
algorithms, but the backward propagation in each layer needs to
be separated in a chain rule, from the output layer to the input
layer step by step.
2.2 Collaborative Learning
To avoid privacy leakage of sensitive data distributed among
multiple clients, collaborative learning is a new computing archi-
tecture that learns a global prediction model without sharing the
training data [10], [11], [12], [13]. During the training process, a
central server maintains a global model and randomly chooses
a subset of clients to update the model in each round. The
chosen clients download the current global model and compute
an updated model based on their local data, and then return the
updates to the server. After receiving results from all the chosen
clients, the server aggregates those updated models (typically by
averaging) to construct a new global model. Algorithm 1 provides
the pseudocode of model averaging.
2.3 Poisoning Attacks
Generally, poisoning attacks assume the existence of an attacker
(e.g., a malicious client) who aims at changing the behaviors
of a trained model on specific inputs through manipulating the
training dataset, e.g., changing the labels of records, or injecting
poisoned training data samples. Concretely, two prevalent types
of attacks have been proposed. In label-flipping attacks [3], [14],
the attacker flips the labels of all the original data samples of one
class to another class. In backdoor attacks [15], [16], the labels of
data samples with certain features are relabeled, and the features
can be exploited to fool the model. The former is preferred for
scenarios that data samples with the same labels are similar, e.g.,
face recognition, and the latter is more suitable for scenarios that
samples in a class are diverse, e.g., image tagging.
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Algorithm 1: Collaborative learning with model averaging
1: ServerExecutes:
2: Initialize the global model w0
3: for round t = 1 to T do
4: Ct ← the server randomly chooses K clients
5: for each client i in Ct do
6: Lit+1 ← ClientUpdates(i, wt)
7: end for
8: wt+1 ← wt + 1K
∑K
k=1 L
k
t+1
9: end for
10:
11: ClientUpdates(i, w):
12: Download the current global model w
13: for iteration i = 0 to I do
14: bi ← randomly choose a batch from its local data
15: w ← w − η∇l(w, bi)
16: end for
17: send w to the server
In collaborative learning, prior works show that the model is
vulnerable to poisoning attacks as well [1], [2], [3]. The attacker
can generate a poisoned model by carefully crafting its local
training data or updated model. But the difficulty for poisoning
collaborative learning is that averaging the updates performed on
the server side may mitigate the effect of the poisoned update on
the global model. To achieve a successful attack, two methods
have been proposed [3]. One is scaling the poisoned update by a
large factor. If the attacker knows the number of clients and the
global learning rate, it can replace the average with the poisoned
update as follows:
˜Lt+1m =
n
η
X − (n
η
− 1)Gt −
m−1∑
i=1
(Lt+1i −Gt)
≈ n
η
(X −Gt) +Gt.
(1)
The other is controlling multiple clients through generating sybils
to increase the influence of the poisoned updates on the averaged
model.
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND THREAT MODEL
We consider the generic setting for collaborative learning, where
a central server and N clients jointly train a learning model
with a given training algorithm. All the training data are kept by
clients locally, while the global model is shared among clients
for classification or prediction. Our goal is to defend against
poisoning attacks (i.e., detecting anomalous updates) carried out
by malicious clients. Besides, following prior works [17], [18], we
also aim to prevent malicious clients from stealing other clients’
private data.
We assume that an attacker can fully control a proportion p of
clients (sybils) (0 < p < 1), i.e., the attacker can manipulate the
training processes by changing the target training algorithm, the
training data of the controlled clients, the hyperparameters when
updating a model, or directly modifying the parameters of the
updates. Following [3], we call the primary training task as the
main task, and the goal of controlling the behavior of the model as
the attacker-chosen subtask (and we use “subtask” for simplicity
in the rest of the paper). We consider a more aggressive (or say
Notation Description
t the t-th training round
K the number of chosen clients in the current round
St the set of K clients
Lit the update of the i-th client
wt the global model in the t-th round
wit the i-th sub-model in the t-th round
d the number of sub-models in the current round
u the number of updates for generating a sub-model
m the number of sub-models that a client can evaluate
e the number of clients that evaluate one sub-model
cit the penalizing coefficient of w
i
t
TABLE 1: Important notations
concealed) attacker who also tries to aid the main task (i.e., making
the global model achieve a high accuracy), instead of harming it
considered in [9].
We assume that the central server is honest, and the outputs of
any algorithm running on the server are correct. Besides, the rest
(1−p)N clients are assumed to be honest as well, and their model
updates are correctly computed over the honest data. Note that the
inputs of benign clients cannot be tampered by the attacker. We
consider a varying proportion of malicious clients, and we will
show how this proportion affects the detection performance in
Section 6.3. More importantly, differing from existing solutions of
detecting poisoning attacks [1], [9], we do not restrict the number
of malicious clients and the distribution of the training data. Data
can be independent identically distributed (IID) or non-IID across
clients. We only assume that there is a sufficient number of training
data such that each class of data is held by multiple clients. We
summarize the important notations in Table 1.
Types of poisoning attacks. In this paper, we consider two
practical poisoning attacks: label-flipping attacks and semantic
backdoor attacks [3]. Both of these two approaches can be imple-
mented by changing labels without modifying data samples such
as the pixels of images. The attack will succeed when the inputs
of the victim lie in the poisoned set. Note that there exists another
attack type called pixel-pattern attacks [15], [16]. To introduce a
backdoor into the model, however, the attacker needs to modify
both the training-time data and the test-time inputs. We emphasize
that such an attack is difficult to be deployed in collaborative
learning since the test-time inputs belonging to an honest client
cannot be compromised. Therefore we do not consider pixel-
pattern attacks in this work.
4 DEFENDING AGAINST POISONING ATTACKS:
OUR APPROACH
Intuitively, we observe that if the server has a large test dataset
with ground-truth labels, it can easily detect anomalies by feeding
honest inputs to the updated model and comparing the results with
the ground truth. In collaborative learning, however, the server has
no access to the datasets held by clients. Hence our key insight
is delegating such a detection process to clients who are able to
perform this task. Simply speaking, the server sends the mod-
els/gradients to a set of selected clients, each of which evaluates
the accuracy of the model according to a predefined rule over its
local dataset. The server finally adjusts the weights of updates
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Fig. 2: An overview of our scheme
Algorithm 2: IID Delegation
1: Randomly shuffle the K updates
2: Wd ← Average every u updates to obtain d sub-models
3: for each update i ∈Wd do
4: for j = 1 to e do
5: Randomly choose a client k from St
6: if wit is not generated by k’s update and the number of
sub-models assigned to k is less than m then
7: Assign wit to k
8: else
9: Randomly choose another client from St
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
when averaging according to the evaluation results received from
clients. Figure 2 presents an overview of our scheme.
In this section, we first present our scheme of detecting
poisoning attacks in the IID setting, then extend it to the non-IID
setting. Finally, we briefly discuss the feasibility of our schemes.
4.1 Poisoning Attacks in the IID Setting
Now we present our defense method against poisoning attacks in
the IID setting. We propose delegating the detection process to
the clients, who can detect abnormal updates through evaluating
the performance of the updates over their own data. In an ideal
situation, each client measures the performance of all the updated
models, which results in the highest success rate for detecting
attacks. In practice, however, downloading and evaluating all the
updates are obviously impossible due to unbearable computation
and communication costs. In light of this, we propose randomly
selecting a small set of clients to evaluate each model. Due to the
IID distribution of the training data across different clients, we can
still achieve a high detection rate only if the selected clients have
sufficient data samples.
Delegating detection task. From the perspective of security
and efficiency, the strategy of allocation needs to satisfy the fol-
lowing three requirements: (1) any update should not be assigned
to its owner. Otherwise, it is possible for an attacker to evade
the detection by forging evaluation results; (2) the number of
models assigned to the same client should not exceed a predefined
threshold. If a client needs to evaluate much more uploads than
others, waiting for its results may cause a significant delay in this
round; (3) the communication costs should be as small as possible.
The first two requirements can be easily satisfied by adding the
corresponding constraints in the allocation function. For the third
requirement, we propose aggregating a batch of updates into a sub-
model for evaluation rather than dealing with them individually.
Specifically, the server randomly partitionsK updates into d parts.
Then each part will be aggregated into a sub-model by averaging
u = Kd updates. Every sub-model will be randomly assigned to e
clients, and every client will evaluate m (m < d) sub-models. We
mainly consider two types of attacks. One is that some samples
are misclassified into a certain class with high probability, and the
other is that the accuracy of the model is degraded significantly.
Both of these two attacks can be detected by evaluating the
performance of the sub-models on certain classification tasks.
Algorithm 2 provides the pseudocode of delegating the detec-
tion task to the clients.
Model aggregation. In general, the model updates are ag-
gregated by averaging. The server can adjust the weights of
the updating in the averaging based on the clients’ evaluation
results, such that an update with a higher probability of being
poisoned has a lower impact on the global model. For the weight
adjustment, a naive approach is letting the client report the number
of correctly classified data samples when evaluating the update.
However, this method is vulnerable to a malicious client who
reports an arbitrarily large value for a poisoned model in order
to add its weight. Therefore, we propose using the strategy of
majority voting, where the clients are only required to submit a
binary matrix claiming whether the corresponding category of data
samples is correctly classified.
According to the binary matrix, the server is easy to summarize
the count that an update has been reported to be potentially
malicious. To adjust the weights of the updates, we add a pe-
nalizing coefficient for each update based on the counts. We
observe that such a coefficient should be as small as possible
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Algorithm 3: Detection in IID setting
1: ServerExecutes:
2: Initialize the global model w0
3: for round t = 1 to T do do
4: St ← Randomly choose K clients
5: for each client k in St do
6: Lkt+1 ← ClientUpdate(k,wt)
7: end for
8: IID Delegation
9: for every client who performs the detection do
10: rk ← Return the binary matrix of the evaluation results
11: end for
12: for i = 1 to d do
13: Compute the penalized coefficient cit+1
14: end for
15: wt+1 ← wt + 1d
∑d
i=0 c
i
t+1w
i
t+1
16: end for
when the count is low due to the potential false-positive reports
of the updates. We design a hierarchical method to determine
the coefficient c according to the returned results as follows. We
first give three observations: (1) with the increasing of anomaly
reports, the coefficient should reduce sharply when the reports
have higher confidence, (2) if more than half of the clients report
the anomaly for the same sub-model, it should be discarded in the
aggregation and (3) if there is only one client reports the anomaly,
the penalizing coefficient should not be too large as the result
might be inaccurate. Based on these observations, we propose the
following penalizing function:
cit = max(
−2
(e− 2)2 (r
i
t)
2+
4
(e− 2)2 r
i
t−
2
(e− 2)2 +
1
2
, 0), (2)
where rit is the number of clients who report the i-th update to be
potential malicious in round t. The initial penalizing coefficient
when only one anomalous update is reported (i.e., rit = 1) is set
to be 0.5. In Section 6.3 we will show the effectiveness of our
penalizing function in degrading the accuracy of the subtask to
mitigate poisoning attacks. In summary, the model aggregation in
our scheme is formulated as:
wt+1 = wt +
1
d
d∑
i=0
cit+1w
i
t+1. (3)
The pseudocode of this process is shown in Algorithm 3.
4.2 Poisoning Attacks in the non-IID Setting
To extend our detection scheme to the non-IID setting, we only
need to modify our client selection strategy, and the model
aggregation design remains unchanged since it is completed on
the server side which is irrelevant to the distributions of the data.
Delegating detection task. The main difference between the
IID and non-IID settings is the imbalance between classes in
clients’ datasets. Some classes of data samples may only exist
in a part of clients. Therefore, the models trained by these clients
cannot be directly evaluated over other clients’ data. To tackle
this problem, we design a protocol to dynamically distribute sub-
models to suitable clients for evaluation, where the clients will
only evaluate the sub-models over their data classes. Specifically,
we let each client first tell the server if the number of data samples
for each label is larger than a threshold, such that the server can
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Fig. 3: Collecting information about the distributions of clients’
data
assign models to the clients who have sufficient samples of the
same class. At the beginning of each round, this information will
be updated by the clients due to the possible changes in the local
data. It can be represented with a binary vector where 1 means
that the client has sufficient data for a given class, e.g., it has more
than 100 car images, otherwise 0. Figure 3 presents an example
of this process. In each round, based on the updated information
about the local data, the server will select a set of new clients who
have the datasets with the most similar classes.
Another problem for the non-IID setting is that there lacks
the sufficient number of clients who can evaluate samples of
some classes. As a result, it hard to balance the workloads and
some clients will be assigned too many evaluation tasks, causing a
significant delay. More specifically, in each round, if d > em, the
number of evaluators is not enough to detect all the sub-models.
To solve this problem, before delegating tasks, the server first
sums the binary vectors received from clients and sorts the result
in descending order, and then sets d to be the smallest value in
the resulting vector. Finally, K updates are aggregated into d sub-
models.
Note that if some clients have multiple classes of data, its
detection results can be reused to reduce the communication cost
of assigning a new candidate. Figure 4 depicts a brief example
for this process. For a sub-model wi, the server assigns all the
evaluation tasks to 4 clients while every class is evaluated by two
clients (i.e., e = 2). Since the first client holds the data for digit 1,
3 and 4, it is assigned to evaluate the accuracy of the sub-model
that classifies these three digits. Then the server only needs to
choose another one who holds these classes of data, rather than
choosing two new clients. For example, for digit 1, we will assign
the evaluation to the first and the fourth clients.
Algorithm 4 provides the pseudocode of delegating detection
tasks in the non-IID setting.
4.3 Discussions.
In this section, we discuss the feasibility and effectiveness of our
defense method.
Feasibility. Our design is based on the assumption that there
exist honest clients with sufficient data samples to evaluate the
updates. Since one of the motivations for collaborative learning is
utilizing more data collected from diverse clients to improve the
performance of the model, our assumption is easy to be satisfied.
In this paper, we concern about two representative scenarios of
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collaborative learning. The first one is the cooperation of multiple
institutions, e.g., training a diagnostic model between multiple
hospitals, or constructing a recommendation system between mul-
tiple malls. In this case, allocating every sub-model to several
clients is enough to ensure the correctness of the detection, since
each client is able to collect diverse data. The other scenario is fed-
erated learning that aggregates massive individual users’ data [19],
e.g., training a model for mobile keyboard prediction [20]. In this
case, a very large number of clients are involved since each client
does not have enough data set to train an accurate model. These
two application scenarios further demonstrate the feasibility of our
assumption.
Effectiveness. If there is only a single malicious client, the
poisoning attack can be easily detected since most of clients,
who are honest participants, will report the bad performance of
the poisoned update. While the attacker controls multiple clients
by creating sybils, the detection performance might be degraded
since the poisoned updates may evade detection when they are
assigned to another malicious client who reports false results.
Let p denote the proportion of malicious clients. In each round,
the server randomly samples K different updates and aggregates
u updates to obtain a sub-models. Each sub-model is delegated
to e clients. The probability pevd that a poisoned sub-model is
delegated to t malicious clients is:
pevd =
u∑
i=1
(K(1−p)
u−i
)(Kp
i
)(K
u
) × (Kp−it )(K(1−p)−u+ie−t )(K−u
e
) . (4)
For example, if the server chooses 100 clients in this round with
10 malicious clients included, and each update is delegated to
3 clients. The probability that a sub-model which includes one
poisoned update is delegated to one malicious client is 0.12. The
probability that it can evade the detection, i.e., all the 3 clients who
evaluate the update are all malicious is 0.0003, which is negligible.
In fact, finding a part of poisoned updates, rather than all of them,
would be enough to mitigate the poisoning attack. In summary, our
scheme remains effective even if multiple clients are compromised
by the attacker. We will show how the number of sybils affects the
detection performance in Section 6.3.
We note that our framework can be combined with the existing
defense solutions against sybil attacks such as FoolsGold [2],
which measures the cosine similarity between updates and dis-
Algorithm 4: non-IID Delegation
1: v ← Record clients who hold the data of each class in St
2: num← Count the number of clients for each class
3: m← Find the minimum number in num
4: Randomly shuffle all the K updates
5: Wd ← Average every u updates to get m sub-models
6: for each sub-model wi ∈Wd do
7: for each class j do
8: for k = 1 to |vj | do
9: Randomly choose a clients k from vj
10: if wi is not generated by k’s update and the number
of sub-models assigned to k is less than e then
11: Assign wi to k
12: else
13: Randomly choose another client from vj
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
17: end for
cards the ones that are of significant similarity. Specifically, the
server can run FoolsGold first to identify sybils, and then adjusts
the allocation strategy to reduce their weights. Note that we can
modify the cosine similarity of multiple malicious clients by
adding orthogonal noise vectors to their updates. As the noises
will decrease the accuracy of the model significantly, the honest
clients can detect abnormal updates more easily.
5 PRIVACY PROTECTION
As indicated in [17], [18], directly revealing aggregated updates
to the adversary may reveal the information about whether a client
joins the learning process, which is called client-level privacy.
Moreover, compared with computing global model, the sub-
model is derived from fewer clients. In light of this, we propose
integrating differential privacy to our scheme to protect client-level
privacy.
Protecting client-level privacy. The server can disguise the
sub-models by injecting Gaussian noises directly, and send the
perturbed sub-models to the clients. The clients will evaluate the
performance of the perturbed sub-models and return the evaluation
results, based on which the server adjusts the weights of the
updates. Since all the updates in a round are partitioned to
multiple disjoint sets before adding noises, the above process
only spends the privacy budget once according to the parallel
composition theorem [21], [22]. Besides, our experimental results
in Section 6.3 show that adding noises to the sub-models has a
negligible impact on the accuracy of detecting anomalous updates.
Note that it is necessary to disguise the global model before
publishing. Since every update is accessed twice, it will double
the privacy cost in each round. Fortunately, the total privacy cost
can be bounded in a tight range to obtain a meaningful privacy
guarantee by using the moments accountant [23]. And the noises
have a negligible impact on the performance of the global model
as well, as shown in [17], [18].
Privacy vs. Detection Rate. The number of updates that are
aggregated into sub-models is a major factor for the performance
of detection. Intuitively, using fewer updates to generate the sub-
model makes it easier to detect which update has been poisoned.
However, this enables the attacker to infer the content of the
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Fig. 5: The effect of the sub-model’s size on its accuracy
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Fig. 6: The effect of the number of poisoned updates on the sub-model’s accuracy
updates from a smaller set, leading to the increase in the risk
of privacy leakage. We thus observe that there exists a trade-off
between the detection rate and the privacy guarantee. According
to the implementation of client-level privacy [17], we have:
wt+1 = wt +
1
K
(
K∑
i=0
∆wi/max(1,
||∆wi||2
S
) +N (0, σ2S2)).
(5)
With the decreasing of K , i.e., the number of updates in ag-
gregation, the influence of poisoned update on the sub-model is
increasing, making it easier to detect them. In contrast, to keep the
usability of the sub-model, the noise should be maintained in a low
range, which causes a weaker privacy guarantee. We will evaluate
the impact of differential privacy guarantee on the detection rate
in Section 6.3.
6 EVALUATION
We implement a prototype of our scheme with Tensorflow [24].
All the experiments are performed on a workstation with Ubuntu
16.04, Intel Xeon W-2133 CPU, 64 RAM and an NVIDIA 2080Ti
GPU card.
6.1 Datasets
Since the label-flipping attack and the semantic-backdoor attack
are designed for different tasks, we evaluate our scheme for these
two attacks on two different datasets. For the label-flipping attack,
we use MNIST, the well-known handwritten digits dataset which
consists of a training set with 60,000 examples, a test set with
10,000 examples [25]. Each example consists of 28x28 pixels and
a label. The pixel values are in the range of [0, 255], and all the
values are normalized into the scope of [0,1]. For the semantic-
backdoor attack, we use CIFAR-10 [26] as the same with [3]. It
consists of 60,000 32x32 color images in 10 classes and every
class includes 6,000 examples. 50,000 examples are partitioned
into the training set and the others belong to the test set. All the
pixel values are also normalized into [0,1].
6.2 Setup
We construct a CNN with two convolutional layers with 32 and
64 channels respectively, a fully connected layer with 512 neurons
and a softmax output layer for the MNIST task. Both of the
two convolutional layers are followed with a 2x2 max pooling
layer. In total, it has 1,663,370 parameters. The task for CIFAR-
10 uses the lightweight ResNet18 model [27], which has about
2.7 million parameters and consists of 17 convolution layers
and one fully-connected layer. All the benign clients perform
the training algorithm and set the batch size as 64, using the
GradientDescentOptimizer with the default learning rate.
The label-flipping attack is implemented by changing all the
labels from 1 to 5 on the malicious clients’ datasets. In particular,
we enhance the prior label-flipping attack [2] by scaling the
poisoned update as did in the backdoor attack [3]. The semantic-
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Fig. 7: The accuracy of the subtask when performing the attack
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Fig. 8: The accuracy of the global model vs. the penalized coefficient
backdoor attack is implemented in the same way as with [3].
Examples of cars with racing stripes, vertical stripes on back-
ground wall and painted in green are relabeled as birds. Moreover,
we expand the dataset with 1,000 randomly rotated and cropped
versions of backdoor samples. And we measure the success rate of
the attack on the original and the extended datasets respectively.
To simulate the IID setting, we randomly divide all the normal
examples into N parts where N is the number of clients. For
the non-IID setting, we follow the method proposed in [19] that
divides the training set into 2N shards where data examples of
each shard have the same label, and then assigns each client with
only 2 shards. Then we add the poisoned samples into all the
datasets of malicious clients. The performance of the model is
evaluated by measuring its accuracy in every class.
6.3 Experimental Results
The performance of the sub-model. In our design, several
updates are averaged to obtain a sub-model. To show the effect
of sub-models on the detection rate, we assume that each client
only involves one poisoned update, and vary the number of honest
updates from 1 to 9. The accuracy of the honest updates on the
main task is about 93%.
According to Equation (1) which scales up the poisoned
update, we can find that the magnitude of the poisoned update
depends on the scaling factor (i.e., the estimated proportion of
global learning rate and the number of involved clients). Since the
poisoned update is scaled up significantly in general, if the server
aggregates the sub-module with fewer updates than the guessed
scaling factor, its magnitude will be too large to preserve the
accuracy of the global model. Figure 5 presents the accuracy of
the main task and the subtask with different numbers of honest
and malicious clients. Here we set the scaling factor n to be
10. The attacker can achieve satisfied accuracy on both tasks
simultaneously only when the scaling factor is the same as the
size of the sub-model. With the increasing of honest updates, the
accuracy on the main task will increase as honest updates have
larger influences than the poisoned updates. Moreover, when the
scaling factor is related to the number of clients in generating
the sub-model, aggregating sub-models will further reduce the
influence of the poisoned update. If the scaling factor is larger
than the number of honest updates, the accuracy of the sub-model
decreases significantly, which makes it easier to detect anomalous
updates.
From Figure 6 we can see that the accuracy on the main task
will decrease when more poisoned updates are chosen to generate
the sub-model. This is because more scaled updates will expand
the magnitude of the sub-model. If there are too many poisoned
updates, the accuracy on the main task and the subtask decreases
dramatically. We owe it to the fact that excessive magnitude
destroys the usability of the model completely. In summary, if
a sub-model includes more poisoned updates, it has a higher
probability to be detected.
The performance of the global model. In our scheme,
determining if an update is anomalous depends on its classification
accuracy. If the accuracy is much lower than the current global
model, it will be considered as a poisoned update. Therefore, the
accuracy of the global model on the main task is a crucial factor to
correctly detect anomalous updates. Besides, it is also important
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Fig. 9: The effect of the Gaussian noise on the accuracy of the sub-model
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Fig. 10: Computation costs with different size of the test set
for successfully completing the attack, since the backdoor will be
forgotten quickly if it is injected when the global model has not
converged [3].
Figure 9 shows the success rate of attacks at different stages
of convergence. We vary the accuracy of the main task as (50%,
70%, 80%, 90%, 95%, 98%). For both of the two tasks, we set
the number of honest clients as 10 and the malicious client as 1.
We can see that even if the attack is successful as expected, it
will be forgotten after 20 rounds when the accuracy of the main
task is less than 90%. The prediction results output by a model
with low accuracy are unreliable, and the attack will fail when the
global model has acceptable performance. Based on these results,
we set the accuracy of the main task to be 90% in the following
experiments.
Evaluating the penalizing coefficients. When a sub-model is
considered to be anomalous by some clients, it is penalized by the
coefficient in aggregation rather than excluded. Figure 8 shows the
effect of the penalizing coefficient on the aggregation. We assume
that there are 10 sub-models and one of them completes the attack.
If no one reports the results about the poisoned sub-model, the
attack will be considered as successful. If anyone reports it and
sets the penalizing coefficient α = 0.75, the attack still cannot
be mitigated. When the poisoned sub-model is penalized by 0.5,
the accuracy of the subtask is about 15%, which means that the
attack has a low success rate. Therefore, we conclude that it is
appropriate to set the initial value of the coefficient to be 0.5.
Even a sub-model is misclassified by a client, it still can help to
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Fig. 11: The probability of evading the detection vs. the propor-
tion of malicious clients
improve the accuracy of the global model. And two reports on the
same poisoned update reduce the success rate of attack to 10%.
These results confirm that our design on the penalizing coefficient
in Equation 2 is suitable.
The number of malicious clients. If there is a large pro-
portion of malicious clients, the returned results from delegated
clients may be compromised. Figure 11 presents the effect of the
proportion of malicious clients on generating a sub-model. We
measure the effect by computing the probability that a poisoned
sub-model is delegated to other malicious clients. We set that the
server chooses 100 clients to update the model in every round,
aggregates their updates into 10 sub-models and delegates every
sub-model to 3 clients. The probability of tampering the results
increases with the increasing of the proportion of malicious clients.
Even if only one honest client is reporting the anomaly, the success
rate of the attack will be decreased.
Computation and communication costs. The main limitation
of our scheme lies in the computation costs for testing the updates
on the client side and the communication costs of transmitting
sub-models to clients.
On the client side, since reporting the results is very efficient,
the main cost is derived from downloading the sub-models. During
the detection, the communication cost increases linearly with the
number of sub-models. If the number of clients is much larger
than the number of sub-models, evaluating two models for each
client is enough for successful detection. On the server side, the
communication cost is negligible since the number of sub-models
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TABLE 2: Comparison with the state-of-the-art solutions
Method Technique Single-shot attack IID data non-IID data Single attacker Sybils Preventing convergence
Auror [1] Clustering × X × X × X
FoolsGlod [2] Measuring similarities X X X × X X
Krum [9] Minimizing distances X X × X X ×
Ours Accuracy auditing X X X X X X
is much less than the number of clients.
In our experimental evaluations, we set the total number of
clients to be 100, and in each round the server chooses 50 clients
to update the model and aggregates them into 10 sub-models. Each
sub-model is delegated to 3 clients and every client detects 3 sub-
models. Therefore, the server chooses 10 clients to perform the
detection. The size of ResNet20 (LeNet) is 3.67MB (6.34MB).
The communication cost for detection between the server and the
clients is 110.1MB (190.2MB), which is practical as far as we
concern.
The server does not have significant computation cost as the
detection is performed on the client side. Obviously, the cost
depends on the size of the dataset for each client. Note that testing
the accuracy of the received sub-model is much more efficient than
training. Figure 10 presents the computation costs of detection and
training. The results can confirm this observation.
Client-level privacy. To achieve client-level privacy, the effec-
tiveness of detection may be degraded since the clipping bounds
and added noises will reduce the influence of the poisoned update.
Figure 9 shows the effects of record-level privacy on the detection.
We vary the variance of noises from 0.001 to 0.01 and set the
clipping bound to be 15 as did in [18]. Compared with the previous
results which do not include privacy protection, we find that client-
level privacy does not cause significant accuracy loss when the
variance is smaller than 0.003. Therefore, the detection rate based
on auditing the model’s accuracy will not be affected by the noises.
7 RELATED WORK
Poisoning attacks. The original poisoning attacks try to break
the integrity of the trained model by changing the behaviors of a
trained model when receiving some specific inputs. Many attacks
aim at changing the labels of the training data [16], modifying
the original data examples [15] or injecting well-designed param-
eters into the trained model [28], [29]. Typical examples include
evading spam filters and malware detections.
Obviously, the above methods cannot be implemented in col-
laborative learning. Firstly, the training data are held by multiple
clients and cannot be accessed by any other party. Secondly, the
training algorithm (i.e., the structure of the model) is defined by
the server and known by all the clients. An anomalous model
with a special structure will be detected immediately when it is
observed by the server or a client.
Although it is difficult for the attacker to control other clients,
generating a poisoned model locally is easy to be realized.
However, such a trivial attack cannot affect the behavior of the
aggregated model. The main reason is that the influence of the
poisoned model will be mitigated when the updates are averaged.
Therefore, generating sybils and the constrain-and-scale methods
are the possible approaches to enhance the poisoned model by
controlling multiple clients and scaling up the updates [1], [2],
[3].
Defense approaches. Some prior works try to detect poisoned
model in the training data by evaluating data points with the
trained model, utilizing trusted data to train an anomaly detector,
pruning the trained model or identifying features associated with
the class [4], [5], [30], [31]. These methods are not applicable in
collaborative learning since the server has no access to the training
data.
To tackle this problem, new methods have been proposed
which only need to observe the updates. Auror [1] provides a
statistical mechanism to complete anomaly detection by using
k-means algorithm to cluster the updates of clients. However, it
assumes that the attack is executed in every training round. Prior
results [3] have shown that a single-round attack is still effective.
On the other hand, when the training data of clients are non-IID,
it will reduce the accuracy of clustering. Moreover, if the attacker
can control 5% of clients, the attack will achieve 50% success rate
on the main task while evading the detection.
Evaluating the cosine similarities of updates is a possible
defense solution [2]. The key idea is that the directions of
poisoned updates which are derived from the sybils are similar.
If multiple updates are similar to each other, all of them will
be discarded when performing the aggregation. This method is
especially suitable for the non-IID setting where the distributions
of updates may vary significantly with the clients. But it cannot
defend against a single malicious client. Besides, the attacker
can evade this detection by decomposing the poisoned model
into several orthogonal vectors and letting every controlled client
update one component [2].
Byzantine tolerant distributed learning is another research area
which can eliminate the effect of abnormal updates in collabo-
rative learning while ensuring the convergence [9], [32]. Since
these methods assume that the goal of the attacker is to reduce
the performance of the trained model, they can not prevent the
poisoning attack where the attacker aims to maintain the model’s
performance on the main task. Moreover, convergence is hard
to be preserved when the training data are non-IID. In Table 2,
we have summarized the differences between our scheme with
existing solutions.
Privacy-preserving machine learning. There exists a long
line of work which aims to protect the privacy of the sensitive
training data. Cryptographic tools such as homomorphic encryp-
tion and secure multi-party computation have been leveraged to
complete machine learning algorithms on encrypted data [33],
[34], [35]. These techniques can only be used in a centralized
setting, i.e., all the operations are computed on a server (or several
non-colluding servers). This makes the training process vulnerable
to the poisoning attack. On the other hand, these techniques do not
apply to collaborative learning.
Differential privacy is another popular technique which can
prevent privacy leakages [17], [18], [23], [36], [37]. It can be com-
bined with the distributed setting to achieve lower computational
costs. Concretely, there are two flavors of the definition of privacy.
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One is record-level privacy which aims to protect the existence
of every record in the training dataset [23]. The other one called
client-level privacy aims to protect the participation of every client
in the training process [17], [18]1. In short, all the updates are
clipped to a bound, then random noises are added to the gradients.
As all the clients cannot access other clients’ datasets and updates,
and each client contributes multiple sensitive data when training,
protecting the whole dataset of a client is more important in
collaborative learning [17]. The prior results [3] show that using
differential privacy in collaborative learning can mitigate the poi-
soning attack as clipping and perturbing the uploaded parameters
will change the direction of the poisoned model. However, the
attack can still be successful when the attacker controls more
clients to upload poisoned updates.
Secure aggregation is another scenario of protecting the pri-
vacy of updates in a collaborative learning [38]. It can prevent any
other party from knowing the specific updates of clients. To this
end, the server can no longer use any method to detect anomalies
of the updates. Even if there exists a method that can detect the
poisoning attack from the trained model, collaborative learning
will fail since there is no way to determine the identity of the
attacker in secure aggregation.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the poisoning attack in collaborative
learning system and presented a novel scheme for detecting
anomalous updates. By realizing client-side cross-validation, we
delegated the detection task to the clients who are able to evaluate
the performance of the updates. Our scheme applies to both
IID and non-IID setting. Besides, we also protect the client-
level privacy by integrating differential privacy to our design. The
experimental results demonstrate that our scheme is robust to the
existing poisoning attacks.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Shen, S. Tople, and P. Saxena, “Auror: defending against poisoning
attacks in collaborative deep learning systems,” in Proc. of ACSEC’16.
ACM, 2016, pp. 508–519.
[2] C. Fung, C. J. Yoon, and I. Beschastnikh, “Mitigating sybils in federated
learning poisoning,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.04866, 2018.
[3] E. Bagdasaryan, A. Veit, Y. Hua, D. Estrin, and V. Shmatikov, “How to
backdoor federated learning,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.00459, 2018.
[4] N. Baracaldo, B. Chen, H. Ludwig, and J. A. Safavi, “Mitigating
poisoning attacks on machine learning models: A data provenance based
approach,” in Proc. of AISec’17. ACM, 2017, pp. 103–110.
[5] J. Steinhardt, P. W. W. Koh, and P. S. Liang, “Certified defenses for data
poisoning attacks,” in Proc. of NeurIPS’17, 2017, pp. 3517–3529.
[6] M. Kloft and P. Laskov, “Security analysis of online centroid anomaly
detection,” Journal of Machine Learning Research, vol. 13, no. Dec, pp.
3681–3724, 2012.
[7] Y. Chen, L. Su, and J. Xu, “Distributed statistical machine learning
in adversarial settings: Byzantine gradient descent,” Proc. of SIGMET-
RICS’17, vol. 1, no. 2, p. 44, 2017.
[8] D. Yin, Y. Chen, K. Ramchandran, and P. Bartlett, “Byzantine-robust dis-
tributed learning: Towards optimal statistical rates,” in Proc. of ICML’18,
2018, pp. 5636–5645.
[9] P. Blanchard, R. Guerraoui, J. Stainer et al., “Machine learning with
adversaries: Byzantine tolerant gradient descent,” in Proc. of NeurIPS’17,
2017, pp. 119–129.
[10] T. Chilimbi, Y. Suzue, J. Apacible, and K. Kalyanaraman, “Project adam:
Building an efficient and scalable deep learning training system,” in Proc.
of OSDI’14, 2014, pp. 571–582.
1. In [18], these two methods are called “example-level privacy” and “user-
level privacy”.
[11] J. Dean, G. Corrado, R. Monga, K. Chen, M. Devin, M. Mao, M. Ran-
zato, A. Senior, P. Tucker, K. Yang et al., “Large scale distributed deep
networks,” in Proc. of NeurIPS’12, 2012, pp. 1223–1231.
[12] Y. Lin, S. Han, H. Mao, Y. Wang, and W. J. Dally, “Deep gradient
compression: Reducing the communication bandwidth for distributed
training,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.01887, 2017.
[13] M. Zinkevich, M. Weimer, L. Li, and A. J. Smola, “Parallelized stochastic
gradient descent,” in Proc. of NeurIPS’10, 2010, pp. 2595–2603.
[14] Q. Cao, L. Shen, W. Xie, O. M. Parkhi, and A. Zisserman, “Vggface2:
A dataset for recognising faces across pose and age,” in Proc. of FG’18.
IEEE, 2018, pp. 67–74.
[15] T. Gu, B. Dolan-Gavitt, and S. Garg, “Badnets: Identifying vulnera-
bilities in the machine learning model supply chain,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1708.06733, 2017.
[16] A. N. Bhagoji, S. Chakraborty, P. Mittal, and S. Calo, “Analyzing
federated learning through an adversarial lens,” in Proc. of ICML’19,
2019, pp. 634–643.
[17] R. C. Geyer, T. Klein, and M. Nabi, “Differentially private federated
learning: A client level perspective,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.07557,
2017.
[18] H. B. McMahan, D. Ramage, K. Talwar, and L. Zhang, “Learning
differentially private recurrent language models,” Proc. of ICLR’18,
2018.
[19] B. McMahan, E. Moore, D. Ramage, S. Hampson, and B. A. y Arcas,
“Communication-efficient learning of deep networks from decentralized
data,” in Proc. of AISTATS’17, 2017, pp. 1273–1282.
[20] J. Konecˇny`, H. B. McMahan, F. X. Yu, P. Richta´rik, A. T. Suresh, and
D. Bacon, “Federated learning: Strategies for improving communication
efficiency,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.05492, 2016.
[21] C. Dwork, K. Kenthapadi, F. McSherry, I. Mironov, and M. Naor, “Our
data, ourselves: Privacy via distributed noise generation,” in Proc. of
EUROCRYPT’06. Springer, 2006, pp. 486–503.
[22] C. Dwork and J. Lei, “Differential privacy and robust statistics.” in Proc.
of STOC’09, vol. 9, 2009, pp. 371–380.
[23] M. Abadi, A. Chu, I. Goodfellow, H. B. McMahan, I. Mironov, K. Talwar,
and L. Zhang, “Deep learning with differential privacy,” in Proc. of
CCS’16. ACM, 2016, pp. 308–318.
[24] “Tensorflow,” https://www.tensorflow.org.
[25] “Mnist,” http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/.
[26] “Cifar-10,” http://www.cs.toronto.edu/∼kriz/cifar.html.
[27] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun, “Deep residual learning for image
recognition,” in Proc. of CVPR’16, 2016, pp. 770–778.
[28] J. Dumford and W. Scheirer, “Backdooring convolutional neu-
ral networks via targeted weight perturbations,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1812.03128, 2018.
[29] Y. Ji, X. Zhang, S. Ji, X. Luo, and T. Wang, “Model-reuse attacks on
deep learning systems,” in Proc. of CCS’18. ACM, 2018, pp. 349–363.
[30] Y. Liu, S. Ma, Y. Aafer, W.-C. Lee, J. Zhai, W. Wang, and X. Zhang,
“Trojaning attack on neural networks.”
[31] K. Liu, B. Dolan-Gavitt, and S. Garg, “Fine-pruning: Defending against
backdooring attacks on deep neural networks,” in Proc. of RAID’18.
Springer, 2018, pp. 273–294.
[32] M. Shayan, C. Fung, C. J. Yoon, and I. Beschastnikh, “Biscotti: A ledger
for private and secure peer-to-peer machine learning,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1811.09904, 2018.
[33] R. Gilad-Bachrach, N. Dowlin, K. Laine, K. Lauter, M. Naehrig, and
J. Wernsing, “Cryptonets: Applying neural networks to encrypted data
with high throughput and accuracy,” in Proc. of ICML’16, 2016, pp.
201–210.
[34] J. Liu, M. Juuti, Y. Lu, and N. Asokan, “Oblivious neural network
predictions via minionn transformations,” in Proc. of CCS’17. ACM,
2017, pp. 619–631.
[35] P. Mohassel and Y. Zhang, “Secureml: A system for scalable privacy-
preserving machine learning,” in Proc. of S&P’17. IEEE, 2017, pp.
19–38.
[36] R. Shokri and V. Shmatikov, “Privacy-preserving deep learning,” in Proc.
of CCS’15. ACM, 2015, pp. 1310–1321.
[37] L. Zhao, Q. Wang, Q. Zou, Y. Zhang, and Y. Chen, “Privacy-preserving
collaborative deep learning with unreliable participants,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Information Forensics and Security, 2019.
[38] K. Bonawitz, V. Ivanov, B. Kreuter, A. Marcedone, H. B. McMahan,
S. Patel, D. Ramage, A. Segal, and K. Seth, “Practical secure aggregation
for privacy-preserving machine learning,” in Proc. of CCS’17. ACM,
2017, pp. 1175–1191.
